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Abstract
WirelessHART standard is becoming a reference as a wireless solution in industrial
process automation and control. The WirelessHART network performance is mainly
determined by its main component: the Network Manager, responsible for creating
and configuring the WHART network, as well as managing routing and scheduling
communications between devices.
Due to the novelty of the WirelessHART standard (2010), there is not an open-
source design or implementation of the WirelessHART Network Manager available.
Only Dust Networks has a commercial Network Manager in the market. This fact
makes the WirelessHART Network Manager an interesting area of research.
In this thesis, we present a layered interface-oriented component-based architecture
and the software design for the WirelessHART Network Manager. Furthermore, we
give solution to some of the question marks left by the WHART specification regarding
the Network Manager operation. Due to the modularity of the proposed design and
architecture, the software components can be reused in other WirelessHART devices
such Gateway or Field Devices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the latest years, emerging technologies have been introduced to meet the require-
ments of industrial process automation. Particularly, wireless technologies such Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSN) have notably grown in importance. In this sense, WSNs
represent a paradigm shift in today’s industrial processes. A reduced cost and eas-
ier installation and deployment of the wireless components are the main reasons for
considering a wireless solution in industrial applications.
Despite the significant advantages provided by wireless technologies, the available
wireless standards were not conceived to cope with industrial requirements. For this
reason, HART Communication Foundation developed WirelessHART. WirelessHART
is considered to be the first open standard for Wireless Sensor Networks specifically
designed for industrial process and control automation.
WirelessHART is based on the proven and widely-used wired HART Communi-
cation Protocol [13]. On March 2010 WirelessHART was approved as the First In-
ternational Standard for Industry Process Automation by the IEC (International Elec-
trotechnical Commission). Furthermore, on June 2010 it was approved as the First Eu-
ropean National Standard for Wireless Communication in Process Automation by the
CENELEC, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization [2]. Wire-
lessHART establishes a secure and reliable wireless mesh network communication pro-
tocol. It adds wireless capabilities to the HART Protocol while maintaining backwards
compatibility with widely-used HART devices.
However, WirelessHART is a recently developed standard. Consequently, a fraction
of the components defined in its architecture remain without a detailed-requirement
analysis and design. In this regard, the most important component, which lacks of
an exhaustive analysis, is the Network Manager. The Network Manager is the central
component in WirelessHART and is responsible for forming and configuring the net-
work, managing routing and scheduling, and monitoring the overall communication
performance.
In this thesis, we extend the specification for the WirelessHART Network Manager
and provide a software architecture and design.
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1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Configuration and formation of the WirelessHART mesh network is centrally managed
by the Network Manager (NM). Thus, the Network Manager plays a key role within
the WirelessHART network. It is responsible for configuring the network, scheduling
communications, managing route tables and monitoring the health1 of the network. Its
design determines the overall performance of the network. A proper design of the NM
means to optimally fulfill the requirements of the industrial communications.
Nevertheless, there is not a standardized open-source design of the Network Man-
ager available. In our view, the absence of a clear and detailed description of the
Network Manager can discourage the establishment of the WirelessHART standard:
(1) Other existing standards may provide a complete specification of their architecture,
making them easier to adopt by the industry. (2) A misinterpretation of the NM defini-
tion may lead to inefficient and heterogeneous implementations. (3) Finally, delegating
the requirement analysis and design to developers may introduce a supplementary ef-
fort, in addition to the implementation cost itself.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a better understanding and our own Wire-
lessHART Network Manager specification and architecture design. It can be used as a
reference for implementing or perform specific research in subfunctions of the Wire-
lessHART Network Manager.
1.2 Goals
The main goals of the present thesis are depicted as follows:
• Perform an exhaustive analysis of the WirelessHART specification and its com-
ponents, giving special emphasis to the kernel of the present thesis: the Network
Manager.
• Provide the specification of the requirements of the Network Manager. The Wire-
lessHART standard does not dedicate a single document for the Network Man-
ager. All the information for understanding the Network Manager procedure is
spread over several specifications
• Give solutions to the specification gaps regarding the Network Manager, since
the WirelessHART standard leaves open a plenty of question marks regarding the
important operation of the NM.
• Propose a software architecture and design of the Network Manager, including
detailed description of its internal subcomponents.
1.3 Research Method
In the present thesis, we deal with a qualitative research methodology. We proceeded
initially identifying the general problem by an exhaustive analysis of the WirelessHART
specification and related work. Later on, we decomposed the identified general prob-
lems into several defined and standalone tasks. Then, we specified the software re-
quirements of the WirelessHART Network Manager and subsequent design. Finally,
1The WirelessHART Network Manager gathers health reports from the network, which provide informa-
tion regarding communications performance.
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we performed iterative enhancements of the design after exhaustive revision and veri-
fication.
1.4 Scientific Contributions
The scientific contributions of the present thesis are mainly three:
• The requirements of the Network Manager are spread over several documents
within the WirelessHART standard. This work contributes in a compact specifi-
cation of the software requirements of the WirelessHART Network Manager and
its functionality.
• A significant part of the Network Manager specification remains uncompleted,
leaving up to the designer important decisions. We propose solutions to some
of these unspecified features regarding the Network Manager. For instance, time
synchronization and communication between the NM and the Gateway2.
• The most relevant task of the present thesis is to provide a complete and fully
detailed design and architecture of the WirelessHART Network Manager, which
has not been provided yet to the best of our knowledge. The final goal of the
mentioned design is to go one step further in research regarding WirelessHART
instead of providing a commercial solution of the Network Manager.
1.5 Thesis structure
The remaining part of this thesis has been structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we give
a general overview of the requirements for sensor networks in Industrial Applications.
Later on, we introduce alternative protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks: Bluetooth,
ZicBee and ISA100.11a, concluding why WirelessHART is chosen as object of study.
At the end of the same chapter, the related work is depicted. In chapter 3, we present
a detailed description of WirelessHART standard. Afterwards, we provide the software
requirements of the Wireless HART Network Manager, that is, what the software is in-
tended to do. Moreover, we introduce the proposed solutions to the specification gaps.
In chapter 5, we introduce the necessary background, such as software design tools
—UML and software design patterns—, to properly understand the rest of the chapter.
Then, we elucidate the architecture and detailed design of the Network Manager. We
conclude the thesis proposing future research lines and drawing some conclusions.
2The Gateway is an important component of the WirelessHART, link between the host applications, the
Network Manager and the Field Devices (refer to section 3.2)
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This work deals with an emerging open standard, WirelessHART, specifically designed
to fulfill the requirements for Wireless Sensor Networks applied to the process indus-
try. In this manner, a prerequisite in the process of understanding the WirelessHART
standard resides in giving a general overview of the requirements for industrial wire-
less communications. This knowledge will aid the reader to recognize the motivations
behind the distinct features of WirelessHART and to understand the need of a standard-
ized solution in the process industry. Furthermore, in this chapter we will describe
briefly the generic characteristics of other existing communication protocols for Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSN) such as Bluetooth, Zigbee and ISA100.11a, that may be
applicable in the industry. Later on, we conclude motivating the reasons why Wire-
lessHART is the chosen object of study. Finally, the last part of this chapter will refer
to the related work.
2.1 Requirements for industrial wireless sensor network
applications
Industrial process and automation networks have been traditionally wired networks
which imply additional costs of deployment and maintenance. With the growing de-
velopment of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) many efforts have been done for in-
troducing the wireless technology in the process industry. A reduced cost and easier
installation and deployment of the wireless components are the main reasons why for
considering a wireless solution in industrial applications.
Nevertheless, once it has been proven that the wireless technology can be appli-
cable in the process industry, the next step is to guarantee the fulfillment of the strict
industrial-communications requirements. The latter, combined with the need of inter-
operability between vendors, motivate the necessity of a standard for wireless industrial
communications.
The requirements for industrial communications do not change substantially with
the introduction of the wireless technology in the process industry. The key require-
ments for communications in industrial automation and control processes are security
and reliability. However, in the WSN’s domain there are other parameters to take into
account when designing a communications protocol for the industry. These parameters
are power consumption, scalability and backwards compatibility.
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Security in industrial communications is of great importance, specially when con-
sidering wireless communications, where the medium is shared and accessible. In
the industry, the exchange of information must be irrevocably confidential in order
to avoid possible industrial espionage, that may lead the competence to a strategic
vantage. A standard specifically design for industrial communications must include
powerful methods of encryption and authentication for the sake of guaranteeing secure
communications.
Reliability is another relevant industrial requirement since it determines the ability
of the system to perform its required functions under determined conditions. For in-
stance, guaranteeing transmissions with max delay is of great importance in industrial
communications. Additionally, industrial environments are typically harsher for wire-
less communications in terms of interferences and physical obstacles which can spoil
the proper operation of the system. Failures in the industrial equipment due to commu-
nications are translated into economical loss for the industrial user. Thus, a industrial
communication standard must consider techniques such network robustness, frequency
and path diversity and reliable message delivery1 in favor of increasing the reliability
of the system.
Concerning Wireless Sensor Networks, other factor to take into consideration is the
power consumption. Lower power consumption implies higher battery lifetime, that is
to say lower cost. Notwithstanding, power consumption may not be as critical as other
requirements such security and reliability.
Wireless technology is considered to be a paradigm shifter in the process indus-
try. The industrial standard should consider backwards compatibility with the existing
wired networks in the process industry. The reason why is to save massive cost in
equipment renovation, allowing a more gradual investment by the industrial compa-
nies.
There are a few standardized solutions for Wireless Sensor Networks available that
could be used for industrial process automation. Those will be discussed in the next
section.
2.2 Wireless protocols for industrial automation
The present thesis refers to WirelessHART as the main candidate as a wireless solu-
tion in the process industry. However, there are other standardized communication
protocols that may be used for industrial automation but with some drawbacks. In
the following subsection we will describe briefly the features of Bluetooth, Zigbee,
ISA100.11a and conclude why WirelessHART is the chosen wireless standard in this
thesis.
Bluetooth and ZigBee are wireless standards designed for general-purpose Wire-
less Sensor Networks (WSN) applications, whereas WirelessHART and ISA100.11a
are specifically targeted at wireless industrial communications. Industrial applications
usually have stricter timing requirement and higher reliability and security concern, in
comparison with office applications.
Finally, all the communication protocols to be depicted bellow have in common the
use of the unrestricted 2,4 G Hz ISM radio band.
1Assure end-to-end communications.
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2.2.1 Bluetooth
Bluetooth [25] [1] is an open wireless communication protocol targeted at Personal
Area Networks (PAN). It is widely-used in short-range2 office applications.
Bluetooth provides useful features such channel hopping and time slots which in-
crease the reliability of the system. However, the standard does not make any effort to
guarantee an end-to-end wireless communication delay. In addition, Bluetooth assumes
quasi-static reduced star topology3, making it inviable in large process control appli-
cations where scalability plays an important role. Furthermore, Bluetooth’s security[6]
is optional and only provides a Eo stream weak cipher algorithm with no security at
application layer. Finally, Bluetooth wireless devices have a limited battery lifetime
compared to other energy efficient wireless standards. In summary, Bluetooth is not
suitable for industrial applications as it does not meet the strict industrial requirements
regarding security, scalability and power consumption.
2.2.2 ZigBee
The same way as Bluetooth, ZigBee protocol [5] [28] is targeted at Personal Area
Networks (PAN). However, unlike Bluetooth, ZigBee provides means for an energy
efficient operation, thus increasing the battery lifetime and saving costs.
ZigBee is built upon the IEEE 802.15.4 phyisical and MAC layer (see Figure 2.1).
ZigBee is secured by a 128-bit AES cipher algorithm and user defined security at ap-
plication layer. In this sense, ZigBee is secure enough to be used in an industrial set-up.
In addition, the stated communication protocol allows mesh topology and provides rel-
atively fast communications. Nevertheless, as Bluetooth, ZigBee does not make any
effort to provide a guarantee on end-to-end wireless communication delay. Further-
more, ZigBee does not provide means of frequency diversity, path diversity or reliable
message delivery. Interferences and persistent obstacles, usually inherent to industrial
environments, are a great problem for a communication protocol such as ZigBee.
In conclusion, ZigBee is not suitable for industrial process applications since it
does not meet the requirements of reliability and industrial-grade network robustness.
In the other hand, ZigBee satisfies the industrial requirements of security and power
consumption.
2Range up to 10 meters.
3Star topology with 1 master and up to 7 slaves.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of Wireless HART and Zigbee protocol stack in the OSI model.
2.2.3 ISA100.11a
As stated earlier, WirelessHART is considered to be the first open standard for Wireless
Sensor Networks specifically targeted for Industrial process automation and control
systems. However, the International Society of Automation (ISA)[3] developed paral-
lely the ISA100.11a standard: “Wireless Systems for Industrial Automation: Process
Control and Related Applications”.
ISA 100.11a was recently approved as a wireless communication standard. It pro-
vides great methods of security such asymmetric cryptography and object-based ap-
plication layer security. Additionally, ISA 100.11.a establishes means of reliability
though frequency diversity, network robustness and reliable message delivery.
ISA 100.11a is regarded as the great competitor of WirelessHART. It is designed
to satisfy optimally the industrial requirements of security, reliability, scalability and
power consumption. However, it does not include a backwards compatibility with
the existing industrial technology, making more costly its establishment in the process
industry.
2.2.4 WirelessHART
WirelessHART was created to fulfill the existing gap in the industrial wireless stan-
dardization. It was born as an extension of the widely-used HART communication
protocol. It is designed to be simple-to-use, self-organizing and self-healing, flexible,
reliable, secure and support the widely-used HART technology.
WirelessHART is a centrally managed mesh network. It is built upon the IEEE
802.15.4 physical layer and it adds its own Data-Link, Network and Application Layer.
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Industrial security and authentication is reached through 128-bit AES (Advanced En-
cryption Standard)4 algorithms that cover end-to-end and hop-to-hop communications.
Medium Access Control (MAC) is based on TDMA schedule with frequency hopping.
Reliability is achieved using methods of frequency diversity, path diversity and mes-
sage delivery retrials. Power Consumption can be efficiently optimized by a proper
management of the communications schedule.
As stated earlier, WirelessHART is designed to fulfill optimally the wireless indus-
trial requirements. In that way, security, reliability, scalability, power consumption and
backwards compatibility are fundamental in WirelessHART.
2.2.5 Summary
The table 2.1 depicts briefly the distinct features of the communication protocols de-
scribed in the previous sections:
Bluetooth Zigbee ISA100.11a WirelessHART
Security Optional High Very High Very High
Reliability Low Very Low Very High High
Power Consumption High Medium Low Low
Scalability Limited (8 device) Medium High High
Table 2.1: Comparative table including the main features of Bluetooth, Zigbee, Wire-
lessHART and ISA100.10a.
In conclusion, WirelessHART is the chosen wireless solution as it is specifically de-
signed to fulfill the industrial requirements of wireless communications and, moreover,
provides a backwards compatibility with the widely-used and proven-to-be-effective
HART technology in the process industry, in contra position with ISA 100.11.a.
4Symmetric-Key Encryption
9
2.3 Related Work
WirelessHART has been thoroughly studied by Kim et al. [23]. This paper describes,
among other things, implementation and design issues when implementing Wireless-
HART architecture.
Many of the related security issues in WirelessHART was studied in Raza et al.
[26]. The authors introduce pros and cons of WirelessHART security scheme alongside
with a prototype implementation of a security manager.
Song et al. [27] and Gustafson [11] propose prototype architectures for Wire-
lessHART. In the first case the authors implement a fairly complete WirelessHART
architecture targeting such critical parts such as synchronization, time keeping, routing
and scheduling. In the later case, the author mainly focuses on higher level issues such
as the Network Layer and the Transport Layer services including reliable data delivery
through the mesh network and handling of commands. None of the mentioned papers,
however, specifically targets specification and implementation issues in WirelessHART
Network Manager as even specification remains independent from it. In this thesis,
we look closely at the Network Manager design issues and the corresponding timing
problems both in real devices and in augmented reality.
A hybrid simulation framework for WirelessHART has been discussed in Kono-
valov et al. [24] based on cross platform implementation in COOJA using real Wire-
lessHART Network Manager plus Gateway and Field devices.
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Chapter 3
WirelessHART
WirelessHART Network Manager is the main component of the WirelessHART net-
work since it determines the overall performance. On the grounds that WirelessHART
has a central management architecture1, it is really important to understand the Wire-
lessHART communication protocol for getting a better conception of the requirements
fulfilled by the standard and the requirements of the Network Manager itself.
For that reason we present in this chapter a general overview of the WirelessHART
standard. We will describe briefly the main features of the WirelessHART protocol and,
later on, we will depict the general architecture of a WirelessHART network, present-
ing the components and main functions related to them. Communications protocols
are better understood when described from OSI-model point of view. Thus we will
describe succinctly the different layers composing the WirelessHART protocol stack.
3.1 Main features
WirelessHART was created as an extension to the legacy HART technology, which
is widely used in industrial process automation applications, providing wireless ca-
pabilities to the HART5 4-20mA protocol. WirelessHART establishes a secure com-
munication protocol standard that utilizes a time synchronized, self-organizing, and
self-healing mesh network architecture. Also WirelessHART provides capabilities of
monitoring network diagnostics and optimizing performance of the industrial process.
The main objectives of the wireless HART standard are:
• Backwards compatibility, i.e. support existing HART technology.
• More flexibility for installing and operating process automation equipment.
• Reliable, easy-to-use, simple communications.
• Interoperability, i.e. allow HART-enabled devices from different manufacturers
to work together.
WirelessHART uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) with frequency hop-
ping for Medium Access Control (MAC) and a centrally managed2 configuration of
the routes and schedule of the network. WirelessHART works on the widely used and
1The Network Manager is the responsible for managing the overall WHART Network.
2By the Network Manager
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shared 2.4 GHz ISM band. For avoiding interferences with other systems working in
the same band (such Bluetooth or Wifi), WirelessHART standard provides mechanisms
such Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and channel Blacklisting, i.e. dis-
allowing the use of determined channels. Reliability is also provided in WirelessHART
by using redundant paths an redundant communication opportunities, that is time slots
in the WHART schedule. These mechanisms, along with the frequency hopping and
channel blacklisting, allow to achieve a high network robustness and a high reliability,
required in industrial applications.
Furthermore, the use of TDMA for the medium access control reduces collisions,
by decreasing shared transmissions, and lowers the power consumption of the devices,
since their radio transceivers are only awake in the slots pre-scheduled by the Network
Manager.
Security in WirelessHART is of great importance and it is achieved through cen-
trally managed secure sessions at the Network Layer and encryption at Data-Link
layer. Due to the significance of security in industrial applications, we will describe
thoroughly the security in WirelessHART in section 4.2.1.
WirelessHART is a hybrid network consisting of wireless and wired devices. Its
architecture and functionality will be described in the following section.
Figure 3.1: Wireless HART network components.
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3.2 Components
Figure 3.1 depicts the architecture of a WirelessHART network indicating all compo-
nents included in the WirelessHART standard. The components of the WirelessHART
network (refer to [18]) are described briefly bellow:
• Network Manager (NM) It is the object of study of the present thesis. It is
the application responsible for forming and configuring the network, scheduling
communication between devices, managing the routing in the network and mon-
itoring and reporting the health of the network. There is only one active Network
Manager per WirelessHART network.
• Security Manager (SM) Application responsible of managing the security re-
sources, that is the security keys, and monitoring the status of the network secu-
rity.
• Gateway (GW) Divided into virtual Gateway and the Access Points (AP) (1 or
more). It is the link between the host applications, Network manager and the
wireless HART network. Responsible of buffering, protocol conversions and
clock source.
• Field Devices (FD) The actual sensors distributed in the industry process capable
of routing and forwarding packets.
• Host applications User applications connected to the backbone network of the
industry that communicate with Field Devices in behalf of fetching process and
control data. The Gateway is the connection point between host applications and
the WirelessHART Network
• Adapters They are the devices providing backwards compatibility by adding
wireless HART capabilities to wired HART devices. It can provide wireless
access to one or more devices.
• Handheld Host application residing on a portable device. It’s aim is the config-
uration, monitoring, calibrating and maintenance of devices. It can be connected
to the WHART network or the plant automation network.
• Routers Devices capable of routing and forwarding packets in the network.
However, they are not connected to the industrial process (sensors or actuators).
They are required when wireless connectivity needs to be improved.
3.2.1 Network Device
In the rest of the thesis we will refer to the concept of Network Device. The term
Network Device refers to any device of the WHART network capable of participating
in forwarding packets within the WirelessHART network. Gateways, Field Devices,
Adapters, Handhelds and Routers are considered network devices. The most common
type of Network Device is the Field Device. It is important to notice that the Network
Manager is NOT considered a Network Device since it does not participate in the Wire-
lessHART network. All the packets which source is the Network Manager are injected
into the WirelessHART network through the Gateway (see [18]).
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3.3 Protocol Stack
The most intuitive way to understand a communications protocol is to describe it from
the packet or layer point of view. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the different
layers of the WirelessHART standard on the OSI layer design model.
Figure 3.2: HART (left) and WirelessHART (right) protocol stack in the OSI model.
WirelessHART is built upon the physical layer IEEE 802.15.4 defining new Data-
Link, Network, Transport and Application layers. In the next sections we will give a
general idea of each layer forming the WirelessHART protocol stack.
3.3.1 The WirelessHART Physical Layer
The WirelessHART physical layer is based mostly on the IEEE STD 802.15.4-2006
2.4GHz DSSS physical layer [22]. This layer defines radio characteristics, such as
the signaling method, signal strength, and device sensitivity. WirelessHART operates
in the 2400-2483.5MHz license-free ISM band with a data rate of up to 250 Kbits/s.
Its channels are numbered from 11 to 26, with a 5MHz gap between two adjacent
channels.
3.3.2 The WirelessHART Data-Link Layer
The WirelessHART Data Link Layer Protocol Data Unit (DLPDU) establishes the
mechanisms for a reliable and secure communication at the Data-Link Layer (DLL).
The DLL resides on top of the IEEE 802.4.15 Physical Layer. The WirelessHART DLL
differs from the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 DLL introducing frequency hopping and channel
blacklisting. The interference in a industrial environment can be reduced with good
management of channel blacklisting, competence of the network manager. In that way
WirelessHART increases the reliability of the system. The DLPDU payload is ciphered
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using a 128-bit AES cipher algorithm thus reaching secure communication at these
level. The Data-Link layer is also responsible for keeping correct synchronization of
the network among the WHART devices.
The WirelessHART DLPDU structure is illustrated in the Figure 3.3
The TDMA Data Link Layer Specification[15] defines five WirelessHART frame
types: Acknowledgment DLPDU, Advertise DLPDU, Keep-Alive DLPDU , Discon-
nect DLPDU, Data DLPDU.Only data DLLPDU contain higher layer’s information in
their payload, the rest are exclusively used by Data Link information. Advertisement
is particularly important in WHART since it contains information about the joining su-
perframes and links for the joining devices. This information is provided by the object
of study in this thesis: the Network Manager.
The configuration of the schedule tables that determine when and to whom to send
the DLPDUs is delegated to the Network Manager. The Network Manager config-
ures them in the process of formation of the WirelessHART Network and, lately, when
adapting the network in behalf of a better performance.
Figure 3.3: Wireless HART Data-Link Layer PDU.
3.3.3 The WirelessHART Network Layer
The Network Layer responsibilities consist of several functions including packet rout-
ing, ensuring secure end-to-end communications and encapsulating the Transport Layer
information exchanged across a network.
The Network Manager is responsible for configuring the routing tables of every
Network Device in the joining process. The routing tables are updated by the Network
Manager when adapting the WirelessHART Network accordingly to the necessities of
performance and communication requirements. In WirelessHART there are three ways
of routing: (1) Graph routing, used when the devices have joined the network and,
therefore have been configured by the NM. It establishes a group of paths, identified
by Graph ID, from source to destination. (2) Source Route, used for diagnostics, es-
tablishes a fixed path from source to destination, and (3) Proxy Route, used when the
device has not yet joined the network.
As stated previously, security is a MUST in industrial communications. For that
reason, WirelessHART provides at this level secure end-to-sessions which are config-
ured by the Network Manager when the devices join the WirelessHART network. The
NPDU is ciphered and authenticated with a 128-bit AES Session Key. In section 4.2.1,
we describe thoroughly security in WirelessHART.
The NPDU header (Figure3 3.4) starts from a Control byte that specifies an ad-
dressing scheme employed and indicates if special routes are used in the reminder of
the header. A Time-To-Live (TTL) field is a counter which is decremented at the each
3Figure from [21] sect. 9.1.
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Figure 3.4: Wireless HART Network Layer PDU.
next hop, hence determining an amount of hops a packet can travel before it is dropped.
An Absolute Slot Number (ASN) Snippet field provides performance metrics and a di-
agnostic information of a network operation. This field specifies the time passed since
a packet was created. A Graph ID field is used to route a packet across a network, iden-
tifying nodes which can be used along the way. Remaining fields specifies addresses
and additional routing options such Proxy Route and Source Route.
Security sublayer is a part of the NPDU header, it is used for data encryption and
the NPDU authentication. Security sublayer Control specifies a type of a security em-
ployed: Join Key, Unicast Session Key or Broadcast Session Key. A Message Integrity
Code (MIC) is responsible for checking data integrity. An overall length of the NPDU
header may vary depending on the length of the source and the destination addresses,
special routes and the counter length. The minimum length of the NPDU header is 21
bytes.
The payload of the NPDU corresponds to the enciphered Transport Layer PDU
which contains the actual HART commands used for communicating in the WHART
Network.
3.3.4 The WirelessHART Transport Layer
WirelessHART Transport Layer ensures an end-to-end packet delivery for all the com-
munications that require acknowledgment such REQUEST/RESPONSE traffic. Figure
3.5 shows the structure of the WirelessHART Transport Layer PDU (TPDU) structure.
The TPDU is enciphered using one of the session keys or the join key. Devices that
wish to communicate must be provisioned with the identical join keys. The Transport
Layer encapsulates WirelessHART Application Layer data, that is an array of aggre-
gated commands.
Figure 3.5: Wireless HART Transport Layer PDU.
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3.3.5 The WirelessHART Application Layer
The application layer is the topmost layer in WirelessHART. It defines various device
commands, responses, data types and status reporting. In WirelessHART, the commu-
nication between the devices and gateway is based on commands and responses. The
application layer is responsible for parsing the message content, extracting the com-
mand number, executing the specified command, and generating responses.
The Network Manager utilizes the Application Layer commands for configuring
and managing the entire WirelessHART Network.
Figure 3.6: Wireless HART Application Layer HART command format.
3.4 Security in WirelessHART
Security in industrial applications, thus in WirelessHART, is mandatory. WirelessHART
provides a reasonable strong security [26] by end-to-end and hop-to-hop secure mech-
anisms through authentication and payload encryption on the Network Layer and au-
thentication on the Data-Link layers.
WirelessHART uses a 4-byte Message Integrity Code (MIC) for authentication and
deciphering. The MIC is generated and confirmed using CCM* mode (Counter with
CBC-MAC (corrected)) with AES-128 as the underlying block cypher. CCM* needs 4
byte-strings as parameters (a, m, N, K), where K is 128-bit AES key, a the additional
data to be authenticated but not enciphered, m the message to be enciphered and N the
13-byte nonce. In the Data-Link Layer, DLPDU are not encrypted but authenticated,
thus the second parameter m is empty, while a includes the DLPDU header and pay-
load. In the case of the Network Layer, the NPDU is authenticated but only the NPDU
payload is encrypted, thus m is the NPDU payload and a is the NPDU header with the
NPDU TTL, Counter and MIC fields set to zero.
The security keys that WirelessHART uses for secure communications are provided
by the Security Manager and distributed by the Network Manager to all devices when
they integrate the network. There are six different security keys for the secure sessions
provided by the Network Layer:
1. Join Key : used by devices for enciphering the join request to the Network Man-
ager. It is provided to the devices manually using the maintenance port.
2. Session Keys: used in pairwise communications between devices and Network
Manager, Gateway and Handheld 4. These keys along the Network Key are
provided in the joining process by the Network Manager using the Join Key
to encipher them (refer to 4.1.1). This Keys will be provided by the Network
Manager only if the credentials presented in the Join request are valid.
(a) Network Manager Unicast Key.
(b) Network Manager Broadcast Key.
4For maintenance purposes
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(c) Gateway Unicast Key.
(d) Gateway Broadcast Key.
3. Handheld Key: used for peer-to-peer communications with the handheld for
maintenance and configuration. This key is provided by the Network Manager
when requested by the Handheld.
In the Data-Link layer devices use two type of keys for hop-to-hop authentication:
the Well Known key, when they wish to integrate the WHART network or in advertise-
ment packets, and the Network Key, provided in the process of joining by the Network
Manager5 and used in normal communications. The Well-Known Key is public to all
devices.
All Security Keys are renewed and rotated according to the security requirements
of the plant automation.
In summary, WirelessHART provides a strong security, transparent to the applica-
tion layer, that fulfills the industrial requirements. The only vulnerability resides in the
fact that the Join Key has to be distributed to all devices prior to initialize the network.
However, if this process is done in a secure way, breaking WirelessHART security is
highly improbable.
5The Network Manager uses the Join Key to encipher the NPDU that contains the Network Key.
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Chapter 4
WHART Network Manager.
Software Requirements
Specification
From the previous chapter, it can be deducted that the Network Manager plays a really
significant role in the configuration and management of the WirelessHART network.
Each protocol-stack layer of each device forming the WirelessHART network is con-
figured by the NM.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a Software Design and Architecture of the
WirelessHART Network Manager. In this sense, it is important to specially understand
the particular functions of the Network Manager.
The Network Manager is responsible for initializing itself and initialize the WHART
Network by configuring the Gateway and Access Points in order to begin advertising.
Advertising will permit other Network Devices to join the network by requesting it to
the Network Manager. The Network manager configures the joining devices with nick-
name, security keys, routes and schedule. Once this step is performed, these devices
are integrated into the network and can consequently advertise in order to allow even
more devices to join the network. Integrated devices can request for communications
resources to the Network Manager. The Network Manager is in control of readjusting
the route map and schedule in order to satisfy the needs. In addition, the Network Man-
ager monitories the performance of the network by keeping track of the Health reports
and alarms sent. Using this information the Network Manager can update the routes
and schedule in favor of a better communication performance.
This chapter refers to the main software requirements of the WirelessHART Net-
work Manager specified in the standard and it also provides solutions to the question
marks left by the specification. This requirements are divided into functional and non-
functional requirements.
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4.1 System Functional Requirements
Functional requirements represent the functions that our software system, in this case
the WirelessHART Network Manager, is intented to perform. The reasons why we in-
clude this section in the thesis, instead of referring to the standard, are: to assure a
better understanding of the functions performed by the NM and to provide a compact
version of the requirements due to the fact that there is not a single specification ded-
icated to the WHART Network Manager. All the information needed to recognize the
functionalities and qualities of the WHART Network Manager is spread into several
specifications [15, 21, 14, 12, 16, 17, 18].
4.1.1 Network Formation and Configuration
The Network Manager is responsible for initializing itself and configuring the Gate-
way(s) for advertising, allowing the WirelessHART network to start. It is also responsi-
ble for configuring the joining devices by means of Nicknames1, Security keys, Routing
and Scheduling.
There is extensive information about network formation and joining process in
the WHART standard (refer to [21], [18]). However, the initialization process of the
WHART network, that is the initial configuration of the Gateway and Access Points.
remains open in the standard since the interface between the Network Manager and the
Gateway are not specified (see section 4.3.2).
4.1.1.1 HART Commands related to Network Formation
The HART commands used by the process of joining to the WHART Network (see
4.3.2 and [17]):
• Command 977 Gateway Join Request (refer to A.1)
• DL Command 961 Write Network Key
• DL/NL Command 962 Write Device Nickname Address
• NL Command 963 Write Session
• NL Command 964 Delete Session
• Commands used for configuring the Schedule (refer to 4.1.3.2)
• Commands used for configuring the Route (refer to 4.1.3.2)
The HART commands used by Field Devices in the process of joining to the
WHART Network (see [16] [17]):
• Command 0 Read unique Identifier
• Command 20 Read Long Tag
• DL Command 787 Report Neighbor Signal Levels
• DL Command 961 Write Network Key
1Short Addresses (2 bytes) used in the Network and Data-Link Layer to make the packet length shorter.
The Long Address (4 bytes) of the devices is used before joining.
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• DL/NL Command 962 Write Device Nickname Address
• NL Command 963 Write Session
• NL Command 964 Delete Session
• DL Command 971 Write Neighbor Property Flag
• Commands used for configuring the Schedule (refer to 4.1.3.2)
• Commands used for configuring the Route (refer to 4.1.3.2)
4.1.2 Routing
Managing Routing in the WHART Network is one of the most important functions that
the Network Manager performs. Routing determines the WirelessHART performance
and reliability. The Network Manager is responsible for creating and managing the
network route, i.e. the complete map of the WHART network. This is accomplished
by managing the route tables of all the devices participating in the WHART network.
There are three types of Routing in WHART:
• Graph: Graphs represent a collection of paths that connect two nodes in the
WHART network. It is the common way of representing the network route for
both upstream and downstream communications. The devices have to be precon-
figured by the Network Manager before using graph routing. Several graphs can
be defined in the network and the graph to be used is indicated in the header of
the Network Layer packet by the Graph ID.
• Source Route: Source routing is a supplement to the graph routing aiming at
network diagnostics. A source route indicates a direct path between source and
destination devices (including intermediary devices). The routing information
is included in the header of the network layer packet (See section 3.3.3). The
intermediary devices do not need to be preconfigured previously with routing
tables. However, there has to be a communication opportunity (link, refer to
section 4.1.3) configured for every hop of the path. In our design we will consider
Source Routes derived from graphs, i.e. a source route as a particular path of a
determined graph.
• Proxy Route: The device that has received the join request from a joining device
serves as the Proxy for initial communications with the NM. The Proxy address
is indicated in routing options in the Network Layer packet.
It is important to mention that the Network Manager is responsible for configuring
the routing scheme and manage the communication tables of the devices but does not
participate actively in routing packets in the WHART network. Network Manager’s
network address is fixed in all the networks and is 0xf390. All the communications
between the Network Manager are made through the Gateway (and Access Point(s)).
All the information about routing in WHART can be found in [18] section 9.1.8,
9.3.3 and 9.4, in [21] section 6.2.3 and 9.1. The Routing tables that the Network Man-
ager has to configure in every device of the WHART network are the Route Table, the
Graph table and the Source Route Table. For more information about the communica-
tion tables refer to [21] section 9.3.2 and [15] section 9.2.
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4.1.2.1 Routing Algorithm
The WHART specification does not define a specific routing algorithm. It is up to the
implementor to decide which routing strategy and algorithm is used for deciding the
best route. A brief routing strategy is summarized in [18] section 9.4.2.
The election of the best suitable routing algorithm for WHART is far beyond of the
scope of the present thesis. In the design of the Network Manager we will not consider
any specific algorithm. We will provide a design as flexible as possible for allowing
implementation of several algorithms without changing the architecture and structure
of the software.
4.1.2.2 HART Commands related to Routing
The HART commands used by the Network Manager for configuring the Network
Route and manage the route tables for all the devices (including the Gateways, refer to
section 4.3.2 and [17]) are:
• NL Command 969 Write Graph Connection
• NL Command 966 Delete Graph Connection
• NL Command 974 Write Route
• NL Command 975 Delete Route
• NL Command 976 Write Source-Route
4.1.3 Network Schedule
The most determinant and challenging function performed by the WirelessHART Net-
work Manager is creating and managing the WHART Network Schedule.
As explained in chapter 3, WirelessHART is based in Time Division Multiple Ac-
cess(TDMA) with frequency hopping. All communications between devices must be
allocated within the WHART schedule, that is to say communications must be config-
ured by the NM, in each device participating, in terms of Time Slot (TS) and Frequency
Offset (FO). Every communication opportunity, determined by time and frequency is
called link. Links are organized within superframes, which is a collection of links as-
signed to time slots repeating in time. Links are part part of the Data-Link Layer data
tables of every Network Device.
Links are configured in every device depending on the features of each communi-
cation. For instance, regarding an unidirectional communication from device A and
B, the Network Manager must assign: (1) Link in A where, in TS0 and FO0, A is
configured to transmit and (2) Link in B where, in TS0 and FO0, B is configured to
Receive. This example can be extend to other cases: broadcast, bidirectional or mul-
ticast transmissions and dedicated or shared transmissions Furthermore, this must be
extended to multi-hop communications.
Superframes are organized by type within the Network Schedule. There are four
types of superframes:
• Management Superframe: Used to schedule all communications related to the
network management such as: join links, Request/response traffic, keep alives...
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• Data Superframe: Configured to include the communication links related to
publish data.
• Gateway Superframe: Superframe that includes links to the Access Points.
Must be shared and active permanently since they are regarded as the portal to
the Gateway and Network Manager.
• Maintenance Superframe: Used for schedule communications between hand-
helds and devices for maintenance reasons.
The entire WHART network schedule can be observed as a collection of super-
frames and links, which is only configured by the Network Manager. Each device is
configured with the superframes and links, i.e. communication opportunities, where it
participates.
Information about scheduling communications in the WirelessHART network can
be found in sections 9.3.4, 9.5, 9.6 in Wireless Device Specification [18] and the spec-
ifications indicated in the sections of the present chapter where scheduling takes part.
4.1.3.1 Scheduling Algorithm
As deducted from the previous section, there exist plenty of communication needs in
WirelessHART. Finding an optimal scheduling algorithm in WirelessHART is regarded
as a challenging and complex task. The WirelessHART specification provides some
guidelines but leaves up to the designer the scheduling algorithm, which is far beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, We will provide a design of the Network Manager
as independent as possible from the scheduling algorithm.
4.1.3.2 HART Commands related to Scheduling
The HART commands used by the Network Manager for configuring the Network
Schedule for all the devices (including the Gateways, refer to section 4.3.2 and [17])
are:
• DL Command 965 Write Superframe
• DL Command 966 Delete Superframe
• DL Command 967 Write Link
• DL Command 968 Delete Link
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4.1.4 Network Diagnostics and Adapting
4.1.4.1 Network Diagnostics
The Network Manager readjusts continuously to changes of the WHART network. For
being aware of how well the network is performing, the Network Manager keeps track
of the health information of each Network device. This is performed by maintaining
record of the Health reports that the network devices send periodically to the Network
Manager. Health reports contain information regarding communication performance
between the wireless devices and their neighbors. Performance is measured using pa-
rameters such: packet loss, number of transmissions, number of retries, etc.
The Network Manager also maintains record of possible communication failures,
which are indicated to the Network Manager through alarm HART commands. More
information regarding Path failure procedure can be found in section 9.4.5 in Network
Management specification [21].
4.1.4.2 Adapting
Using the information provided by the Network Diagnostics, health reports and alarms,
The Network Manager updates the network schedule and route conveniently. This op-
eration can be done periodically or triggered by performance conditions of the WHART
network.
Furthermore, devices can request to the Network Manager for communication re-
sources (bandwidth), i.e. slots in the TDMA schedule. This bandwidth is used for
services between host applications and Field devices.
There are two type of services:
• Block Data Transfer. Data pipes between the Host Applications and Field De-
vices.
• Publish Data. Publishing process data to the Gateway. Host Applications can
subsequently fetch the Process data from the Gateway’s cache.
The Network Manager is responsible for allocating dynamically the service re-
quests from the WHART network. This procedure may need to readjust the scheduling
and routing tables of the devices involved in the determined communication.
The process of Service Request is explained in the standard in Block Transfer Spec-
ification [12], in Wireless Device specification, section 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 9.6.2 [18],
4.1.4.3 HART commands related to Diagnostics and Adapting
The HART commands used by the Devices for reporting the Health to the Network
Manager are shown bellow ( refer to [17]) are:
• Command 779 Report Device Health
• Command 780 Report Neighbor Health List
• DL Command 787 Report Neighbor Signal Levels
In the other hand, the HART commands used by the Devices for reporting alarms
to the Network Manager are ( refer to [17]):
• DL Command 788 Alarm Path Down
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• NL Command 789 Alarm Source Route Failed
• NL Command 790 Alarm Graph Route Failed
• TL Command 791 Alarm Transport Layer Failed
Finally, the HART command used by Field Devices for requesting services to the
Network Manager is ( refer to [17]):
• Command 799 Request Service
HART commands related to Routing and Scheduling may be issued by the Network
Manager if there is a need of readjustment of the WHART network.
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4.2 System Non-functional Requirements
Non-functional requirements, often called qualities of a system, describe how a system
is supposed to be. In contrast with the functional requirements, they do not specify
behavioral aspects of the software system.
4.2.1 Security
Security in WirelessHART is of great importance. The Network Manager is responsible
for distributing all the keys of the WHART Network during the joining process . The
NM must have a secure connection with the Security Manager, which is responsible
for storing and providing the security keys.
All communications with the Network Manager are secured pipes using Session
keys at the Network Layer level.
Regarding the security to be used in the communications between the Network
Manager and the Gateway, the standard leaves an open question. It is up to the designer
to decide which type of secure connection will be used. We propose a simple solution
for solving this problem in section 4.3.2.
4.2.1.1 HART commands related to Security
The HART Command that are used for configuring the Security in the WHART net-
work are:
• NL Command 768 Join Key
• DL Command 961 Write Network key
• NL Command 963 Write Session
• NL Command 964 Delete Session
• Command 823 Request Session
4.2.2 Reliability
Reliability is a key factor to take into account when managing industrial process ap-
plications. The Network Manager needs to be reliable for assuring the correct and
controlled operation of the WHART network and, therefore the industrial applications.
Reliability is provided by the Network Manager by the following mechanisms:
• Redundancy in Routing The Network Manager is responsible for configuring
and managing routing of the WHART network. Creating graphs with redundant
paths makes the system more reliable.
• Redundancy in Scheduling The Network Manager is responsible for managing
the network schedule. By allocating links for different paths of the graph and al-
locating links for retries makes, the Network Manager can improve the reliability
of the overall system.
• Redundancy of the Network Manager itself Network Manager redundancy
is outside of the scope of the WirelessHART specification. Redundancy of the
Network Manager itself can be ensured by having two instances, one active and
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one in-standby Network Manager. Data of both processes must be synchronized
correctly (refer to [18] section 8.8.2).
• Reliability by Transport Layer The WHART transport layer (see 3.3.4) pro-
vides mechanisms for ensuring end-to-end reliable communications between de-
vices in the WHART network (included the Network Manager).
4.2.3 Performance
The performance of the Wireless HART Network Manager can be measured by:
• Maximum number of devices
• Time to Initialize Network
• Time to Join a Device
• Overall throughput
The WHART specification does not define any specific performance constraints for the
creation and management of the WHART network. The only constraints are related
to timing and they refer to the TIMEOUTs for requests to be served. These requests
refer to operations from WHART devices to the Network Manager or vice versa. How-
ever, the TIMEOUTs are configurable and thus the constraints can be adapted to the
particular needs.
The performance of the WirelessHART Network Manager also can be measured
by the resulting performance of the network being managed. In this case, the main
qualities that determine the performance of the Network Manager are:
• Latency
• Power utilization
• Number of hops to the Gateway
• Overall throughput
Performance will not be evaluated in this thesis since no implementation is provided.
4.2.4 Interoperability
This requirement is inherent to the WirelessHART specification. The Network Manager
must be compatible with all HART-enabled devices from different manufacturers, by
meeting all the requirements from the WHART specification. Since we propose some
solutions to open questions of the standard (refer to 5.2), our system will not be com-
patible with the WHART gateways or WHART Security Managers unless they share
common interfaces and functionalities2.
2The standard does not specify,among other things, the interfaces between the NM and the GW and the
NM and the SM
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4.3 Considerations
Once the main requirements of the WHART Network Manager have been introduced,
we will define the operation of our system regarding unspecified or unclear features in
the WirelessHART standard.
4.3.1 Connection between Network Manager and
Gateway
The question about the connection between the WirelessHART Network Manager re-
mains open in the specification, i.e. WirelessHART does not define this connection.
It is up to the designer whether to use Ethernet, Wifi, Serial or other type of connec-
tion between the Network Manager and the Gateway. It is possible also to merge the
Network Manager and the gateway in the same host.
Since the physical connection is a matter of deployment, we are not going to con-
sider any specific connection between the Network Manager and the Gateway. The
design we proposed will be as independent as possible of the physical connection used.
4.3.2 Interface between Network Manager and
Gateway
Another WirelessHART feature, which is not specified in the standard, is the interface
between the Network Manager and the Gateway(s).
In the process of initialization of the WHART Network, the Network Manager must
configure the Gateway(s) and Access Points in terms of initial superframes and links.
This allows the gateway to begin advertisement, which provides joining information to
the Field Devices. This configuration process must be secure and authenticated. The
standard does not specify:
• Security and authentication to be used.
• Interface or API for configuring the Gateway.
That’s the reason why we have to define a secure communication and interface.
The solution we propose is to use:
• HART commands for the configuration of the Gateway
• The security and authentication provided by the WHART Network Layer (Secure
end-to-end sessions).
Thus, the Gateway initialization will be a special case of the joining process, similar
to the joining process of a Field Device.
The reasons why this decision was taken are:
• It is a particular case of configuring a Network Device with HART commands,
not a case itself. Thus all the procedures will be the same.
• More security is provided since, apart from the private secure connection, it pro-
vides a secure pipe between both entities using WHART secure sessions, which
keys are managed centrally by the Security Manager. This WHART secure ses-
sion could even be considered the secure private connection required by the stan-
dard.
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• No further interfaces have to be defined besides initialize and send/receive NPDU.
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks that have to be taken into account such as:
• It will take more time to configure the Gateway since the Network Layer Packets
have to be processed (encryption/Decryption) in both ends.
• More overhead.
Field devices send a Join Request (composed by 3 HART commands in response)
to the network Manager when joining the network presenting the following credentials:
• Device’s Identity (command 0)
• Long Tag (command 20)
• List of detected Neighbors (command 787)
• Join key (used for encrypting the NPDU)
In the other hand, we decided that the Gateway will present the following creden-
tials when connecting to the Network Manager:
• Gateway’s Identity
• Gateway’s Long Tag
• Access Points’ Identity
• Access Points’ Long Tag
• Join key (used for encrypting the NPDU)
Since no HART command is provided by the WHART standard for providing this
information to the Network Manager we define command 977 Gateway Join request
(refer to appendix A.1).
The process of Joining of the Gateway will be as follows:
1. Initial Provisioning: Before attempting to join the Network the Gateway must
be provided with the required Join Key and the Network ID.
2. Presenting Credentials: The gateway generates a command 977 Gateway Join
request to the Network Manager, which will check if the presented credentials
are trusted.
3. Writing Keys and nicknames: The Network Manager generates a Gateway Join
request response with a DR_initiated status 3 and starts to configure the Virtual
Gateway and Access Points by writing the Session keys, the network key and
nickname. The Gateway acknowledges using the new session key.
4. Configuring initial schedule and graph: In this stage the Network Manager
starts to configure the initial Superframes and links as well as the network graph
necessary for the formation of the WHART network. At the end of this process
the Network Manager sends the response of command 977 Gateway Join Request
with a success state.
3Delayed Response. It indicates that the request it’s being processed. After finishing the process of
initialization the Network Manager will response with Success status.
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5. WHART Network epoch: The WHART Network starts when the Network
Manager activates the first superframe (ASN 0). The access points will start
advertising allowing Network Devices join the the network.
4.3.2.1 Security and Authentication between the Network Manager and
Gateway
HART commands encapsulated in WHART NPDUs are used for communicating be-
tween the Network Manager and the Gateway. Thus, the security and authentication is
provided by the secure end-to-end Network Layer sessions. The gateway will use the
Join Key for encrypting the Gateway Join Request command and later will be provided
by session Keys with the Network Manager. Depending on the physical connection
between the Network Manager and the Gateway, another security layer could be added
on top. SSL is one of the possible solutions although it may be regarded as security
over security.
4.3.2.2 Alternative interface between the Network Manager and Gateway
Another solution regarding the interface between the Network Manager and the Gate-
way is to define special service primitives for configuring the Gateway and Access
Points. This service primitives could be defined in a similar fashion as the LOCAL_MA-
NAGEMENT SP from the standard (refer to [21]). This service primitives must be
sent in a secure way, for instance, using SSL for securing the communication between
the NM and the GW.
Figure 4.1: Network Manager and Gateway interface.
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4.3.3 Time Synchronization in the WHART Network Manager
Time synchronization is critical in WirelessHART considering that the media access
control is based in TDMA. All the network devices have to keep track of the time, in
terms of ASN (Absolute Slot number)4, in order to communicate with each other using
the correct scheduled time slots. The entity responsible for providing the time clock to
the overall WHART network is the Gateway.
When trying to design the WHART Network Manager, which is actually the creator
of the WHART Network Schedule, a question comes up: does the WHART Network
Manager have to keep strict Time Synchronization with the WHART Network? and, in
this case, how will it be performed?
After the analysis of the WHART specifications and many discussions we decided
that our WHART Network Manager will not keep a strict time synchronization with
the WHART Network, since the gateway is responsible for the distribution of the time
clock.
However, current time of the WHART Network is needed when constructing the
Network Layer Packets in order to determine when the packet was created, i.e. the
time of birth. This is used for discarding old packets in the other end. The attribute of
the Network Layer that determines how old a packet should be for being discarded is
the MaxPacketAge which is set by default to 300 sec.
The birth time of an NPDU is determined by the field ASN Snippet (refer to back-
ground, section network layer) and this field is set by the Network Manager when
creating the NPDU. This field cannot be set by the Gateway for security reasons, the
ASN snippet it is used when authenticating the NPDU by the NM. Thus NM has to
know the approximate time of birth of the packet in terms of ASN.
As stated earlier, on the grounds that the WHART Network Manager does not need
to keep strictly time synchronization with the WHART Network, an estimation of the
current time can be performed. The solution we propose is to used command 794
Read UTC Time Mapping [17] which provides the time when the WHART Network
was created with a precision of 1/32 ms. Once having this time, the only thing left for
calculating the current time is knowing the current time in UTC with the same precision
and divide the lapse between both by 10 ms for obtaining the current time in terms of
ASN.
For making it work we need to accomplish some requirements:
• The UTC time of the WHART Network Manager and the Gateway has to be syn-
chronized. This is required if the NM and the GW are deployed in two different
physical boxes.
• The precision of the current UTC time has to be 10 ms order.
• The MaxPacketAge has to be adjusted appropriately.
4ASN 0 indicates the time when the WHART network was created and each ASN count means 10ms.
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4.3.4 Regarding the HART Commands implemented
HART commands are the main tool of the WHART Network Manager for configur-
ing the overall WHART network. There is a big set of commands that the Network
Manager could implement for giving more functionalities to the system.
However, for narrowing the scope of the present Software we will consider only the
Mandatory and Recommended commands specified in [17]. We designed the system
in such a way that more functionalities related to new HART commands can be added
easily without modifying the architecture and general design of the WHART Network
Manager.
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Chapter 5
WHART Network Manager.
Design and Architecture
In this chapter the Software Architecture of the WirelessHART Network Manager will
be depicted. All the requirements specified in the previous chapter are mapped and dis-
tributed into the different software components and classes forming the WirelessHART
Network Manager. This chapter contains the most significant part of our work in the
present thesis.
First, we will provide a brief background regarding the software design tools used
in the thesis. Secondly, we introduce the general design considerations and, later, we
will introduce the use cases, which depict graphically the main global functions and its
synthesized description. Finally we will depict the general architecture and design of
the Network Manager, concluding with the detailed description of its subcomponents.
5.1 Background. Software Design Tools
Since our work is based in Software Design and Architecture, it is important to in-
troduce the reader to the Software Design Tools used: Unified Modeling Language
(UML) and Software Design Patterns.
5.1.1 UML Unified Modeling Language
Unified Modeling Language (UML)[4] is the most-used standardized modeling lan-
guage in the field of software engineering. The standard was created by the Object
Management Group (OMG) and includes graphics for providing a visual description
of a object-oriented software system[7]. UML models are used because they help to
create software designs, they permit analysis and review of those designs and they can
be used as the core documentation describing the software system. It is important to
know that the objective of UML is to assist in software development, it is not a software
development methodology itself.
UML describes a software system from two different points of view:
• Static or Structural: It depicts the structural elements composing a system or
function, reflecting the static relationships of a structure. This view includes
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class diagrams, component diagrams, composite structure diagrams and package
diagrams.
• Dynamic or Behavioral: It focuses in the interaction of the system internally
(among objects) and externally (with other systems or users) as well as the de-
scription of dynamic behavior such internal states. This point of view includes
Activity, Use Case, Interaction and State Machine Diagrams.
5.1.1.1 Structural Diagrams
These diagrams reflect the static relationships of a structure, such as Class or Package
diagrams, or run-time architectures such as Object or Composite Structure diagrams.
They are really important when trying to document the architecture of a software sys-
tem [8].
In the present thesis, Class diagrams and Component diagrams are used for describing
the structure and architecture of the WirelessHART Network Manager. Thus, we will
present a brief description of the mentioned diagrams.
Class Diagrams The Class diagram captures the logical structure of the system: the
Classes and the relation between them. Class diagrams are most useful to illustrate re-
lationships between Classes and Interfaces. Generalizations, Aggregations and Associ-
ations are all valuable in reflecting inheritance, composition or usage, and connections,
respectively. Figure 5.1 shows an example of class diagram depicting several classes,
including their attributes, operations and relations among them.
Figure 5.1: Class diagram example showing classes with attributes and operations and relation
among them.
Component Diagrams Component diagrams illustrate the pieces of software, em-
bedded controllers and such that make up a system, and their organization and depen-
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dencies. They represent a higher level than the class diagram. Normally, the software
components can be described internally by class diagrams. Figure 5.2 shows an exam-
ple of component diagram depicting two components and their interfaces.
Figure 5.2: Component diagram example showing the components and interfaces relating them.
5.1.1.2 Behavioral Diagrams
Behavioral diagrams depict the behavioral features of a system or business process. In
the present thesis, Use Case diagrams and Sequence diagrams are used for describing
the dynamic behavior and interaction of the WirelessHART Network Manager. Thus,
we will present a brief description of the mentioned diagrams.
Use Case Diagrams They capture Use Cases and relationships among Actors and
the system. They describes the functional requirements of the system, the manner
in which external operators interact at the system boundary, and the response of the
system. Figure 5.3 shows an example of a use case diagram. A use case diagram can
be documented with written use case description [9] in which the interaction of the
system with the actors is specified.
Sequence Diagrams A sequence diagram is a type of interaction diagram. It rep-
resents series of sequential steps over time. It is used to depict work flow, message
passing and how elements, normally classes or objects, cooperate in general over time
to achieve a result. Figure 5.4 shows an example of sequence diagram.
5.1.2 Software Design Patterns
Software design patterns[10] are widely used in software engineering when designing
a system. They refer to design solutions, already successfully used by others, suitable
for a wide range of design problems. In the process of design of the present thesis,
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Figure 5.3: Use case diagram example.
Figure 5.4: Sequence diagram example showing objects interacting over time.
some software design patterns has been used such Singleton pattern, Factory pattern
and Delegator pattern.
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5.2 Design considerations
Before going into the design details, it is important to mention the design assumptions,
constraints and goals.
5.2.1 Assumptions and Dependencies
The WirelessHART Network Manager design is dependent on the Security Manager and
Gateway since it communicates with them. The communication interfaces between the
gateway and the Network Manager and between the Security Manager and the Network
Manager have to be common.
5.2.2 General Constraints
The constraints are the ones specified in the previous chapter. The WirelessHART Net-
work Manager has to be interoperable and has to take into account all the constraints
determined by the WirelessHART specification.
5.2.3 Goals and Guidelines
The main goal for the WHART Network Manager design is to provide a flexible, ex-
tensible and modular simple architecture. Components should be replaceable and re-
usable.
5.3 Use Case Analysis
In this section we map the requirements specified previously into uses cases specifying
the operations of the WirelessHART Network Manager from an external user point of
view.
This is the first step for creating a software design of the WirelessHART Network Man-
ager. In the next section we will define the users that interact with the Network Man-
ager, i.e. the actors. Finally, we specify with details the most important use cases.
5.3.1 Actors
An actor indicates the particular role played by an entity, person or thing when inter-
acting with the system. The actors can be classified into primary and secondary actors
depending on how direct is the interaction.
5.3.1.1 Primary Actors
The primary actors interact directly with our system. They are listed bellow:
• Security Manager The Security Manager will be responsible for providing se-
curely the necessary WHART keys to the WHART Network Manager.
• Gateway The Gateway will forward requests from the WHART network (From
itself and the Network Devices) to the WHART Network Manager using their
private connection.
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• Administrator The Administrator of the system is the person able to monitor
and configure the overall operations of the system.
5.3.1.2 Secondary actors
The secondary actors interact with the system trough another primary actor, in this case
the Gateway. Our secondary actors are listed bellow:
• Field Device The Field Device will use the gateway as a bridge for communicat-
ing and requesting services to the Network Manager.
• Handheld The maintenance tool or Handheld will interact with field devices,
locally or through the WHART network, and will request services to the Network
Manager using the Gateway.
5.3.2 Primary Use Cases
Use cases determine the interactions between the actors and the studied system for ac-
complishing a determined goal. The next figure indicates the primary use cases of the
WHART Network Manager. For a better understanding of the services provided by the
studied system, we will provide a detailed description of the main use cases including
goals, actors, preconditions, postconditions and sequence of operations.
5.3.2.1 Use case 1 - Initialize WirelessHART network (GW Join Request)
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway, Security Manager -Secondary: Field Device, Ac-
cess Points
• Goal: Configure WirelessHART network for allowing devices to join.
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway.
• Trigger: The gateway sends a Gateway Join Request to the Network Manager.
• Related use cases: includes: configure initial superframes, configure initial graph.
• Success guarantee: The gateway is configured correctly and the access points
begin to advertise. New devices can listen to the advertisement and start joining
the network by join requests.
1. Gateway sends an GW JOIN request (Command 977) to the Network Man-
ager with information about the identity of itself and Access Points.
2. NM authenticates the GW and APs.
3. NM responds with a DR_initiated status and processes the initialization.
4. NM requests for Gateway’s Session keys to the SM.
5. NM sends the Network Key Session keys of the Gateway and Access Points
by HART commands.
38
Fi
gu
re
5.
5:
P
ri
m
ar
y
us
e
ca
se
s
of
th
e
W
ir
el
es
sH
A
R
T
N
et
w
or
k
M
an
ag
er
.
39
6. NM assigns nickname to Access Points and writes them by HART com-
mands.
7. GW sends a response to the HART commands using the configured new
session key.
8. NM creates the initial Route Map and the initial Schedule.
9. NM sends commands for configuring the route tables, superframes and
links.
10. GW sends a response to the HART commands.
11. NM sends the GW Join request response to indicate that the configuration
is performed.
12. NM sends write superframe command (command 965) to activate the first
superframe and thus the network is ready to advertise.
13. GW responds
• Extensions:
2a Gateway not trusted
2b Terminate with message Gateway not trusted.
4a Security Manager does not respond.
4b Terminate with message Security Manager not responding.
7a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
7b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
7c Terminate with message Gateway not responding.
10a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
10b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
10c Terminate with message Gateway not responding.
5.3.2.2 Use case 2 - Device joining the WHART network
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway, Security Manager -Secondary: Field Device, Hand-
held
• Goal: Integrate a Device to be able to fully participate in the WirelessHART
network
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway. The wireless HART network is already initialized
and the access points and joined devices are already advertising.
• Trigger: The Field Device sends a Join request to the Network Manager through
the Gateway (Network Manager will receive the join request through the wired
connection to the Gateway).
• Related use cases: includes: Add Device to Route map and add Device to sched-
ule
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• Success guarantee: The joining Device is configured correctly and can partici-
pate actively in the network.
1. FD sends an Join request (Command 0,20 and 787 in response mode) to
the Network Manager with the credentials.
2. NM authenticates the joining device.
3. NM requests for Device’s Session keys to the SM.
4. NM sends the Network Key and Session keys of the Device by HART
commands.
5. FD sends a response to the HART commands using the configured new
session key.
6. NM assigns nickname and send HART commands to configure device.
7. NM provides clock parent to the device by HART command.
8. NM adds the FD to the Route Map and the network Schedule.
9. NM sends commands for configuring the route tables, superframes and
links to all devices affected by the new configuration.
10. FDs send a response to the HART commands.
11. NM request for Gateway session key with the FD.
12. NM sends HART command writing the Gateway Session key to the FD.
13. FD responds the HART command and becomes OPERATIONAL.
• Extensions:
2a Device not trusted
2b Terminate with message Device not trusted.
3a Security Manager does not respond.
3b Terminate with message Security Manager not responding.
5a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
5b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
5c Terminate with message Device not responding.
10a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
10b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
10c Terminate with message Device not responding.
11a Security Manager does not respond.
11b Terminate with message Security Manager not responding.
13a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
13b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
13c Terminate with message Device not responding.
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5.3.2.3 Use case 3 - Device’s Service Request
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway -Secondary: Field Device
• Goal: Allocate bandwidth needed by a Field Device to perform certain task
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway. The wireless HART network is already initialized
and the Field Device requesting bandwidth to the Network Manager has already
joined the network.
• Trigger: The Field Device sends a Service Request to the Network Manager
through the Gateway (Network Manager will receive the join request through
the wired connection to the Gateway).
• Related use cases: includes: Schedule service
• Success guarantee: Bandwidth is allocated to the Field Device to perform the
service
1. FD sends a Service request (Command 799) to the NM.
2. NM responds with a DR_initiated status and processes the request.
3. NM processes by allocating the requested bandwidth in the schedule. If
necessary updates teh configuration of the network.
4. NM sends HART commands to the FD to configure the superframes (com-
mands 965) and links (Command 967) allocated and the route tables (com-
mand 969-976) if necessary.
5. FD responds to acknowledge the HART commands.
6. NM sends the Service Request response to indicate that the configuration
is performed.
7. FD can perform the service.
• Extensions:
2a If no bandwidth available then NM responds the Service Request indicating
so.
5a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6 and 7.
5b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
5c Terminate with message Device not responding.
5.3.2.4 Use case 4 - Health report update
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway -Secondary: Field Device
• Goal: Update the health of the Wireless HART network in terms of quality and
performance of the different links.
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway. The wireless HART network is already initialized
and the Field Device reporting the health to the Network Manager has already
joined the network.
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• Trigger: The Field Device sends a Health report () to the Network Manager
through the gateway. This operation can be performed periodically.
• Related use cases: It may trigger use case 6 - Update Network.
• Success guarantee: The Network Manager stores the updated information about
the Health of the Network.
1. FD sends a Health report to the NM through the GW.
2. NM verifies the Health report.
3. The NM stores the information within the correspondent Health report in
the database.
4. If the health of the WHART network is under the performance threshold
then Update Network.
• Extensions:
11 Device Health Report (HART Command 779).
12 Neighbor Health List Report (HART Command 780).
13 Neighbor Signal Levels Report (HART Command 787).
2a Health report arrives before Health report update timeout.
2b Discard Health report.
5.3.2.5 Use case 5 - Alarm report
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway -Secondary: Field Device
• Goal: Monitor the communications failures indicated by the Alarm reports.
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway. The wireless HART network is already initialized
and the Field Device reporting the Alarm report to the Network Manager has
already joined the network.
• Trigger: The Field Device send an Alarm report to the Network Manager through
the Gateway (Network Manager will receive the join request through the wired
connection to the Gateway).
• Related use cases: It may trigger use case 6 - Update Network.
• Success guarantee: The Network Manager stores the updated information about
the communications failures of the Network.
1. FD sends a Health report to the NM through the GW.
2. NM verifies the Alarm report.
3. The NM stores the communication failure within in the database.
4. If the number alarm reports for the same failure is over a determined thresh-
old then Update Network.
• Extensions:
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11 Path Down Alarm Report (HART Command 788).
12 Source Route Alarm Report (HART Command 789).
13 Graph Route Alarm Report (HART Command 790).
14 Transport Layer Alarm Report (HART Command 791).
2a Alarm report not valid or redundant.
2b Discard Alarm report.
5.3.2.6 Use case 6 - Update network
• Actors: -Primary: Gateway, Administrator -Secondary: Field Devices, Routers,
Adapters
• Goal: Update the configuration of the network regarding routing and scheduling.
• Preconditions: The Network Manager has a secure connection with Security
Manager and the Gateway. The wireless HART network is already initialized
and there are Field Devices joined to the network.
• Trigger: Updating the network can be done periodically, triggered by the Ad-
ministrator or triggered by a succession of Health reports or Alarms.
• Related use cases: includes: update Route Map and update Schedule
• Success guarantee: The Route map and the Schedule are updated so that a better
performance is achieved.
1. The NM evaluates the available health information about the network (Health
reports and alarms).
2. The NM executes a Route Map optimization using the mentioned informa-
tion.
3. The NM sends HART commands that configures the new routing tables for
each Field Device affected.
4. The NM waits for the responses
5. The NM executes a Scheduling optimization using the health information.
6. The NM sends HART commands that configures the new routing tables for
each Field Device affected.
7. The NM waits for the responses.
8. Updating the network is performed.
• Extensions:
1a If the performance is acceptable, terminate routine.
4a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 3.
4b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
4c Disconnect not-responding device then update network again.
7a If t > TIMEOUT then retry number 6.
7b If number of retries is more that Max number of Retries then Remote De-
vice not responding.
7c Disconnect not-responding device then update network again.
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5.4 System Software Architecture
In this section we will present the features of the architecture design for the WHART
Network Manager.
5.4.1 General System Architecture
Figure 5.6 shows the general system architecture of the WHART Network Manager. We
define a component-based architecture with interface oriented communication between
components. This is a new approach to the Network Manager since no software design
architecture appears in the standard. The benefits of the defined architecture are:
• Modularity The advantage of using modular architecture is that a component
(module) can be replaced easily without affecting the rest of the system.The di-
vision of WirelessHART Network Manager into different components reduces the
complexity of the system. Responsibilities are distributed and smaller problems
will be handled by each component. For example, the Security Manager Client
component can be replaced if different Security Manager is used and the system
will remain unaffected as long as the interfaces are implemented correctly.
• Reusability The system has been divided in such a way that components con be
reused in other WHART software systems such as the Gateway and Field device
with really small changes. In this case, the Application Layer and the Network
Layer components are reusable.
• Decoupling The components are coupled to the interfaces defined between com-
ponents but not to the other components. That makes the division of tasks in a
software development team much more easier.
We decided to divide the system into five software components:
• Network Manager Core Component Responsible for the high-level operations
such as formation and configuration, routing, scheduling and monitoring of the
WHART Network.
• Security Manager Client Responsible for ensuring a private secure connection
with the Security Manager and providing an interface for requesting keys from
it.
• Network Manager Server Responsible for ensuring a private secure connection
and providing an interface for initializing the Gateway and sending/receiving
Network Layer packets to/from the Gateway.
• Network Manager Application Layer1 Responsible for handling and format-
ting HART commands, from specific HART commands for configuring the dif-
ferent layers to Network Management Commands.
• Network Manager Network Layer2 Responsible for ensuring secured end-to-
end communications with the network devices and (Transport Layer and security
sub-layer) constructing the Network Layer packet.
1The Application Layer of the WHART Network Manager will add functionalities to the WHART Appli-
cation Layer of the Field Device, i.e. it will be a superset of it.
2The network Layer of the WHART Network Manager will have less functionalities than the WHART
Network Layer of a Field Device, i.e. it will be a subset of it.
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The WirelessHART Network Manager interacts with the Security Manager and
Gateway, defined as primary actors in the previous chapter. The main component in
the design is the Network Manager Core Component.
Figure 5.6: Wireless HART network manager architecture.
The WirelessHART Standard [19] specifies that the Network Manager is an appli-
cation on top of the WirelessHART protocol stack (refer to network manager scope in
Network Device Specification). However, this could lead to misinterpretations since
the Network Manager must handle secure sessions in the WHART network and end-
to-end communications with WHART Network Devices. The WHART network layer,
which includes transport and security sub-layer, is the responsible for keeping track
of the sessions, encryption-decryption and assuring end-to-end communications. That
is why we decided to include the WHART network layer component in the design.
This software component can be reused in other devices such the Gateway or the Field
Devices.
Furthermore, the WHART Network Manager has to handle HART commands since
all the network transactions are performed using them. This specific responsibilities are
delegated to the WirelessHART Application layer. We include a NM Application Layer
component in the design, that is responsible for handling commands formatting and
interpretation. In this way, the Network Manager Core Component is transparent to the
HART commands construction. The Network Manager Core Component is responsible
for the core tasks regarding network formation, routing, scheduling and monitoring the
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network. For that reason, we provide an subarchitecture design for this component in
the next section.
Since the Network Manager has to handle secure communications with the Security
Manager and Gateway, we have provided the Security Manager Client and the Network
Manager Server to perform this task. In this manner, changing the Security Manager
or Gateway implies changing the mentioned components without affecting the rest of
the design.
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5.4.2 Subsystem Architecture. Network Manager Core Compo-
nent
On the grounds that the main responsibilities of the WHART Network Manager are
delegated to the Network Manager Core Component (NMCC), we present a special
section where the internal architecture of this subsystem is explained. The NMCC is
the center of the whole design. It represents the source and the sink3 of any request
towards / from the WHART network. The critical responsibilities are Routing and
Scheduling, as stated in section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
The main implication of this design choice is that the functions of Routing and
Scheduling are performed separately, i.e. routing is performed independently from
scheduling and scheduling is performed after having a routing map already calculated.
Therefore, a combined algorithm that will consider cross correlation between routing
and scheduling will not be suitable with our design. The reason why we chose this
architecture was to simplify the complexity of the process of routing and scheduling.
Figure 5.7: Wireless HART Network Manager Core Component architecture
3Within the overall architecture of the WHART Network Manager.
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5.5 Detailed System Software Design
In this section the architecture of the Network Manager Core component introduced
in the previous section will be described thoroughly including subcomponents and
classes. The rest of the components will be described briefly without introducing de-
tails about the internal architecture. Furthermore, it is very important to understand
how the different components from the general architecture model are going to com-
municate with each other and how the information will flow. That is why we will first
present and define the interfaces introduced in the general architecture model (refer to
figure 5.6).
5.5.1 Interfaces in the General Architecture
The detailed description of the service primitives and interfaces introduced in the gen-
eral model architecture will be presented in the following subsections. Figure 5.8 shows
the specific interfaces that we defined for communicating between the different soft-
ware components of the general model.
First, the description of every service primitive or function will be depicted and
later on some examples of use will be shown indicating the information flow between
components.
5.5.1.1 Network Manager Application Layer Services. iTransmitAPAL
In order to separate the design of the Application Layer of WHART Network Manager
from the actual Network Manager application we need to define the Service Primitives
for communicating. It is important to notice that, although they look similar, this ser-
vice primitives are not in the standard, we used similar semantics for simplifying the
understanding. In the standard, Data Link and Network Layer Service Primitives are
defined, no Application Layer Service Primitives appear. The Service Primitives are
used for calling to services that the application layer is going to provide to the Network
Manager Core Component or vice versa.
TRANSMIT.request (handle, dest, service, [data]) This Service Primitive will be
called by the Network Manager Core Component when trying to send a HART com-
mand over the WHART network.
• handle The packetHandle is supported for the convenience of the Application.
The Application Layer returns this handle in the correspondent
TRANSMIT.confirm, specified later on.
• dest Indicates the packet’s destination. There are three possibilities.
– uniqueID The long destination address.
– Nickname The short destination address previously assign by the
WHART Network Manager.
– Broadcast Short broadcast address.
• service The service corresponds to the specific HART command that want to be
send. The Application Layer can assemble different TRANSMIT.request in the
same packet if the destination address it is the same and the rules for assembling
commands are respected(refer to Network Management specification, p.56). The
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services names correspond to the mandatory command names from the Data
Link Layer, Network Layer and Network Manager commands in Wireless Com-
mand Specification. In table ?? the service related to Network Management are
indicated.
• [data] The data associated to the service. It is specified in the data structure of
each command in Wireless Command Specification for simplicity.
Service Data Description
DISCONNECT_DEVICE Removes a device from the network
Unsigned-8 reason The Reason of disconnection (See com-
mon table 50. Disconnect Cause Codes).
WRITE_NETWORK_KEY Writes Network key on a Network De-
vice
Unsigned-128 key Key value
Unsigned-40 execTime Execution time for command (ASN). 0
immediately
WRITE_DEVICE_NICKNAME Reads the device nickname, i.e. short ad-
dress
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 963 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_SESSION Write session in Network Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 963 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
DELETE_SESSION Deletes a session from a Network De-
vice.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 964 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_SUPERFRAME Write a new superframe entry to a Net-
work Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 965 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
DELETE_SUPERFRAME Deletes a superframe entry from a Net-
work Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 966 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_LINK Writes a link entry to a Network Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 967 in[17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
DELETE_LINK Deletes a link entry to a Network Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 968 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_GRAPH_CONNECTION Adds a new graph connection entry to a
Network Device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 969 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
DELETE_GRAPH_CONNECTION Deletes a previously defined graph con-
nection entry to a Network Device.
Continued on next page
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Service Data Description
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 970 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_NEIGHBOR_PROPIERTIES Writes the Neighbor table to a Network
Device and sets which ones are the clock
source.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 971 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_SUSPEND_DEVICES Suspends operation of one or more de-
vices.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 972 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_SERVICE Notifies the network device of a new ser-
vice allocated to it.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 973 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_ROUTE Writes a new route to the network device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 974 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
DELETE_ROUTE Deletes a route of the network device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 975 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
WRITE_SOURCE_ROUTE Adds a specific source route to the net-
work device.
Data Same data order as specified in com-
mand 976 in [17]. Request data in the
TRANSMIT.request and response data
in TRANSMIT.indicate
TRANSMIT.indicate (handle, sourceAddr, service, [data]) This service primitive
will be called by the Application Layer for indicating that there has been a request,
Health report or Alarm from the WHART network.
• handle The packetHandle is supported for the convenience of the Application.
The Application Layer returns this handle in the correspondent
TRANSMIT.response, specified later on.
• sourceAddr Indicates the packet’s source Address. There are three possibilities.
– uniqueID The long destination address.
– Nickname The short destination address previously assigned by the
WHART Network Manager.
• service The services supported are specified in table 5.2. Notice that this services
differ from the ones from TRANSMIT.request.
• [data] The data associated to the service is specified in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Services provided by the Network Manager.
Service Data Description
JOIN_REQUEST Join request from a Network Device
which includes commands 0, 20 and 787
in response [17].
Unsigned-40 uniqueID Unique Identifier of the field device.
It is composed by the expanded type
(Unsigned-16) and deviceID (Unsigned-
24) [16]
Latin-1 longTag Long Tag of the network device
Neighbor Signal Levels Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 987 [17].
REPORT_DEVICE_HEALTH Provides information about the device’s
communication statistics.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 779 [17].
REPORT_NEIGHBOR_HEALTH Provides information about the neigh-
bors’ communication statistics.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 780 [17].
REPORT_NEIGHBOR_SIGNAL_LEVELS Provides information about the neigh-
bors’ communication statistics.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 787 [17].
ALARM_PATH_DOWN Network device notifies the network
manager that the path to a neighbor
failed.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 788 [17].
ALARM_SOURCE_ROUTE_FAILED Network device notifies the network
manager that a source route failed.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 789 [17].
ALARM_GRAPH_ROUTE_FAILED Network device notifies the network
manager that a graph route failed.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 790 [17].
ALARM_TRANSPORT_LAYER_FAILED Network device notifies the network
manager that a transport layer failed.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 791 [17].
SERVICE_REQUEST Network device requests additional
bandwidth for providing a service to a
particular application.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
quest command 799 [17].
ACTIVE_ADVERTISE_REQUEST Network device requests active and fast
advertising.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 770 [17].
REQUEST_HANDHELD_SESSION Network device notifies the network
manager that a graph route have failed.
Data Same data structure as specified in re-
sponse command 790 [17].
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TRANSMIT.response (handle, [data]) This service primitive is used by the Net-
work Manager to respond to the requests from the network which will be notified pre-
viously by the TRANSMIT.indicate SP. There will be response only for service request,
active advertise request and hanheld session request.
• handle The handle is supported for the convenience of the Application. The
Application Layer gives this handle in the correspondent
TRANSMIT.indicate, specified above.
• [data] The data associated to the service. It is specified in the table 5.2.
TRANSMIT.confirm (handle, ResponseMessage, [data]) This primitive will no-
tify the Network Manager that a request has been responded by the remote network
device.
• handle The packetHandle is supported for the convenience of the Application
Layer. The Application gives this handle in the correspondent
TRANSMIT.request, specified above.
• ResponseMessage Message from the Command-Specific Response Code. It is
compose by the result of the transaction (Success or Error) and the description
in [17].
• [data] The data associated to the service. The service can be determined by the
handle and the related data is indicated in ??.
5.5.1.2 Local Management service primitives. iLocalManagement
We will use the Local Management Service Primitives defined in the Network Man-
agement specification [21]. They are used by the Network Manager Core Component
to configure the local Network layer tables and attributes. For example, when creating
new session for the joining device the NMCC will call to TRANSMIT.request from the
iTransmitAPAL for sending a HART command that will write a session in the Field
Device. At the same time the NMCC will call to a
LOCAL_MANAGEMENT.request for configuring the session locally in the NM Net-
work Layer. Notice that, for respecting the layered architecture, the NMCC manages
the NM Network Layer using the NM Application Layer. At this stage the NMAL just
forwards the service primitive to the NMNL without being affected. In the future Local
Management SP could be added for configuring the NMAL as well.
5.5.1.3 NM Network Layer Service Primitives. iTransmitALNL
We will use the same service primitives specified in the standard for WHART Network
Layer [21]. They are used by the NM Application Layer in order to send the aggregated
commands to the WHART network. The NMNL also will indicate the NMAL that
incoming packet has arrived from the WHART network and will provide the aggregated
commands to the NMAL. All the information needed for understanding the functions
of the Network Layer Service Primitives can be found in [21].
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5.5.1.4 NM Network Layer to NM Server Service Primitives. iTransmitNLGW
This service primitives will provide an interface between the NM Network Layer and
NM Server components. We define this service primitives in order to indicate the
Network Manager Server to send a new packet to the Gateway or vice versa. It is
important to notice that, although they look similar, this service primitives are not
defined in the standard, we used similar semantics for simplifying the understanding.
In the standard, Data Link and Network Layer Service Primitives are defined.
TRANSMIT.request (handle, NPDU, priority) This service will be called by the
Network Layer when requesting to send a Network packet to the Gateway using the
Network Manager Server.
• handle The handle is supported for the convenience of the Network Layer. The
Network Manager Server gives this handle in the correspondent
TRANSMIT.confirm, specified bellow.
• NPDU The actual Network Layer packet that has to be injected into the WHART
network.
• priority Priority of the packet determined by the payload. It can be Command,
Process Data, normal or alarm (refer to [21]).
TRANSMIT.confirm (handle, GWstatus) This service primitive will be used by the
NM Server to indicate that the Network Layer packet has been sent into the WHART
network.
• handle The handle is supported for the convenience of the Network Layer. The
Network Layer gives the same handle in the correspondent previous
TRANSMIT.request, specified above.
• GWstatus Informs about possible errors in injecting the packet into the WHART
network by the Gateway.
TRANSMIT.indicate (handle, NPDU, priority) This service primitive will be used
by the NM Server to indicate the NMNL that a Network Layer packet has been received
from the WHART network
• handle The handle is supported for the convenience of the Network Layer.
• NPDU The actual Network Layer packet from the WHART network.
• priority Priority of the packet determined by the payload. It can be Command,
Process Data, normal or alarm (refer to [21]).
5.5.1.5 Key Management interface. iKeyManagement
In this section, we will describe the interface between the Network Manager Core
Component and the Security Manager Client. The definition of an interface will make
the design of both mentioned components decoupled. Also, as stated in section 5.4.1
the SM Client component will be easily replaceable to suit the Security Manager used
for providing the correspondent keys.
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void initializeSMClient() This function will initialize the Security Manager Client
for creating a secure connection with the Security Manager. After this step, the SM
Client will be ready to serve all the requests from the Network Manager Core compo-
nent.
SecKey requestSessionKey (networkID, keyType, deviceID) This function is go-
ing to be used by the Network Manager Core Component when creating a new secure
session with a WHART network device, i.e. in the Joining process or when initializing
(secure session with gateway). The Session Key for the device will be returned.
void revokeSessionKey(networkID, keyType, deviceID) This function will be used
by the NMCC when eliminating a device from the WHART network, i.e. after the
disconnect command [17].
SecKey renewSessionKey(networkID, keyType, deviceID) Function used by the
NMCC to renew a Session key to a particular network device.
SecKey requestNetworkKey(networkID) This function will be called by the NMCC
for requesting the security key used for the Data Link Layer encryption. It will be used
when initializing the WHART network in order to configure the WHART network de-
vices. The new Session Key for the device will be returned.
SecKey renewNetworkKey(networkID) Used by the NMCC when changing the
Network Key of the WHART network. The new Network Key will be returned.
5.5.1.6 Gateway Management interface. iGWManagement
This interface defines the interaction between the NMCC and the NM Server. Since all
the configurations will be made by HART commands (refer to previous chapter, section
considerations) the only interface provided is the initialization request.
boolean InitializeGW (networkID, GWuniqueID, APUniqueID) This function will
be called by the NM Server when receiving a Initialization request from the Gateway.
This will trigger the process of initialization of the WHART Network.
5.5.1.7 Information Flow
We will present how the information will flow between components in the case of nor-
mal requesting from the WHART Network and from the WHART Network Manager.
This visual aid will help to understand the relationship between components.
In the case of a request from the WHART network (Fig. 5.9), for example a Join
request 4 , the Gateway will forward the NPDU to the WirelessHART Network Man-
ager using the secure private connection (using Network Manager Client). The NM
Server will receive the encrypted 5 NPDU, then decrypt it and indicate it to the NM
4We define it as a request although the actual HART commands are 0, 20 and 787 in response mode
[21, 16, 17].
5Meaning wired encryption used for secure communicating between NM and GW, NOT WHART Session
encryption.
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Network Layer using the correspondent TRANSMIT.indicate service primitive from
iTransmitNLGW. After that, the NMNL will decrypt the NPDU using the correspon-
dent Session Key and will check from the Transport table whether the packet is the
response to a previously sent packet. In the particular case of a request from the net-
work the NMNL will indicate the NMAL that a new packet has arrived from the net-
work using the correspondent TRANSMIT.indicate service from iTransmitALNL. The
NMAL will receive the aggregated commands from the payload of the NPDU and will
analyze them. In the case of Join Request this aggregated commands will be HART
command 0, 20 and 787 (refer to [17]). The NMAL will extract the data from them and
will indicate the NMCC of a new request from the WHART using the correspondent
TRANSMIT.indicate (service: JOIN_REQUEST) service primitive from iTransmitA-
PAL. The NMCC, after receiving the data of the correspondent service, will handle the
request. In the case of Join Request, the NMCC will proceed generating requests for
configuring the particular device by calling TRANSMIT.request’s from iTransmitA-
PAL (Fig. 5.10). In case of a Service Request, Active Advertise Request or Handheld
Session Request, the NMCC will have to respond after processing the request using the
TRANSMIT.response from iTransmitAPAL. The response data will be indicated to the
NMAL which will format the command(s) and will call to TRANSMIT.response from
iTransmitALNL. The NMNL will encrypt and construct the NPDU and will forward
it to the NM Server using TRANSMIT.request from iTransmitNLGW. The NM Server
will encrypt the data and send it to the Gateway’s NM client. After the packet being
sent into the WHART network the Gateway will send a confirmation to the NM server
which will indicate the NMNL that the packet has been sent by TRANSMIT.confirm
from iTransmitNLGW. In case of not receiving the correspondent TRANMSIT.confirm
from the NM Server (Gateway) the NMNL will initiate a retry after a RETRY TIME-
OUT.
Figure 5.9: Information Flow when a request is received from the Network
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When the Network Manager needs to send HART commands requests to the WHART
network (Fig. 5.10), the NMCC will generate the TRANSMIT.request(s) from iTrans-
mitAPAL indicating the service and the data to the NMAL. The NMAL will format
(and aggregate if possible) the HART commands and will forward them (TRANS-
MIT.request from iTransmitALNL) to the NMNL which will encrypt them and con-
struct the NPDU. After this, the NPDU will tell the NM Server to send the packet to the
Gateway by TRANSMIT.request from iTransmitNLGW. The NM Server will encrypt
the data and send it to the Gateway’s NM client. After the packet being sent into the
WHART network the Gateway will send a confirmation to the NM server which will
indicate the NMNL that the packet has been sent by TRANSMIT.confirm from iTrans-
mitNLGW. In case of not receiving the correspondent TRANMSIT.confirm from the
NM Server (Gateway) the NMNL will initiate a retry after a RETRY TIMEOUT. When
the correspondent response NPDU comes from the Gateway, the NM Server will indi-
cate it to the NMNL by TRANSMIT.indicate from iTransmitGWNL. The NMNL will
decrypt the packet and will check in the Transport table if the packet is the response
of a previous request. In the case of a response packet, the NMNL will forward the
aggregated response commands to the NMAL using TRANSMIT.confirm from iTrans-
mitNLAL. The NMAL will extract the response data from the commands and will
forward it to the NMCC by a TRANSMIT.confirm from iTransmitAPAL. The NMCC
will process this data and the transaction is finished.
Figure 5.10: Information Flow when a request is generated at the Network Manager.
It is important to notice that the described transactions are not sequential, i.e. dif-
ferent service primitives can be called by the components at any time from different
transactions. Thus buffering it is of great importance for handling this service primi-
tives requests.
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5.5.2 Description for Network Manager Core Component
This component is the core component of the WirelessHART Network Manager, as
stated earlier. It represents the Sink and the Source of any request to/from the WHART
network, Security Manager and Gateway. In this section we will describe the main
classes which compose this software component.
5.5.2.1 Description for NetworkManagerProcessUnit
This class is central within the Network Manager Core Component. It is responsible for
handling requests from the WHART network such as initializing the WHART network,
joining, allocation of services, health reports and alarms. It is important to mention
that there can be only one instance of the NetwrorkManagerProcessUnit, i.e. we use a
singleton design pattern.
We will proceed describing the main attributes and methods that define this class.
Attributes Only the main attributes will be summarized for a better understanding:
• NetworkID : Unsigned-16 Determines the ID of the network controlled by the
WHART Network Manager. It Has to be the same than the Gateway and Field
Devices.
• JoinKey : Unsigned-128 Key provided by the Security Manager that devices
use for join sessions. The Network Manager uses it for configuring the Network
Layer component, which is responsible for handling secure sessions. This Join
Key must be the same as the one used in the WHART network.
• NetworkKey : Unsigned-128 Key provided by the Security Manager that de-
vices use for the encryption of the DLPDU. This is used for configuring the
Gateway and all the WHART network devices.
Methods The public methods will be describe briefly:
InitializeWHART
( networkID : Unsigned-16, GWuniqueID : Unsigned-16, APuniqueID : Unsigned-
16) : boolean This function is responsible for the initialization of the WirelessHART
network, which includes configuring the Gateway and Access Points with the initial Su-
perframes and Links and the network graph (refer to 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.3.2) along
with the Network and Session Key and nicknames. Figure 5.11 shows the sequence di-
agram describing the interaction between the different classes in the initialization of
the WHART network process. More information about the sequential procedure can
be found in section 5.3.2.1
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Figure 5.11: Sequence diagram for initialization of the WHART network: initializeWHART.
handleJoin
(UniqueID:Unsigned-16, LongTag:Latin-1, NeighborData:byte[]):boolean Fig-
ure 5.13 shows the sequence diagram describing the interactions between the different
classes in the joining process. This process is perform in a similar way to the process
of initialization. The joining device presents the credentials consisting of UniqueID,
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which indicates the 5-bye address of the device, LongTag, which describes the de-
vice in words, and finally the Neighbor information necessary to perform routing and
scheduling. If the device is trusted, the NMPU responds to the request by configuring
it, i.e. allocating session keys, nickname and managing the route and schedule. More
information about the sequential procedure can be found in section 5.3.2.2
handleHealthReport
( UniqueID:Unsigned-16, RSL[]:Signed-8, healthData[]:byte, neighborHealthData[]:byte
) :boolean Figure 5.12 shows the sequence diagram for the case of storing health re-
ports from the WirelessHART network. More information about the sequential proce-
dure can be found in section 5.3.2.4
Figure 5.12: Sequence diagram for Health report storage.
boolean handleAlarm
(Unsigned-16 UniqueID, alarmType:Enum-8) :boolean The NMPU stores infor-
mation of alarm data in the database in order to maintain information about the health
of the network. More information about the sequential procedure can be found in sec-
tion 5.3.2.5
handleServiceRequest
((nickname:Unsigned-16, serviceID:Unsigned-8, serviceDomain:Enum-8, period:Time)
: boolean The NPDU processes the service request by allocating bandwidth, i.e.
links in superframes in order to make possible the communication. More information
about the sequential procedure can be found in section 5.3.2.3
handleUpdate():boolean The NMPU checks the health information stored in the
database and, later, if necessary, updates routes and schedules of the WirelessHART
network. More information about the sequential procedure can be found in section
5.3.2.6
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5.5.2.2 Description for Routing Unit
Figure 5.14 shows a simple view of the internal structure for this subcomponent.
Routing Unit Interface to NMPU. iRoute
setRoutingAlgorithm(algorithm:Enum-8):boolean It will be used by the Net-
workManagerProcessUnit for configuring the Routing algorithm that is going to be
used.
numAP:int, nicknameAP:Unsigned-16 []):boolean Used in initialization of the
WHART Network for creating the initial graph or Network Graph that defines an up-
stream graph in which the Gateway is the root.numAP indicates the number of access
points and nicknameAP the array of nicknames for the access points. It will return true
when correctly created.
routeDevice(nickname:Unsigned-16):boolean The Routing Unit will be respon-
sible for creating a downstream Graph and add the device into the upstream Graph
(Network Graph). Source Routes can be extracted directly from particular paths of
the graphs. It will fetch information about the Neighbors and it will also save all the
routing tables (Route, Graph and source route tables) for each device affected to the
Network Device Database (refer to 5.5.2.4). It returns true when correctly routed.
unRouteDevice(nickname:Unsigned-16):boolean Used when deleting a device
from the WHART network. It will delete all the tables of all devices affected from the
Network Device Database.(refer to 5.5.2.4). It returns true when correctly routed.
63
Figure
5.14:
Internalarchitecture
for
the
R
outing
U
nitsubcom
ponent.
64
5.5.2.3 Description for Scheduling Unit
Figure 5.15 shows a simple view of the internal structure for this subcomponent.
Scheduling Unit interface to NMPU. iSchedule
setWhiteListChannels
(whiteList:Unsigned-16) :void Function for setting the channels available in the
Network Schedule. Every bit of whiteList represents the correspondent channel.
createInitialNetworkSchedule
(numAP:int, nicknameAP[]:Unsigned-16) :boolean The present function will cre-
ate the initial superframes: management and Gateway superframes as well as the initial
links. The links will support joining, advertisement, request/response traffic, keep alive
s and health reports. numAP indicates the number of access points and nicknameAP the
array of nicknames for the access points. This function will fetch information about
routing from NDDB and store the Scheduling tables correspondent to the Virtual Gate-
way and Access Points in the NDDB (refer to 5.5.2.4). It returns true when the schedule
is created correctly.
scheduleDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16) :boolean Function used by the NetworkManagerProces-
sUnit during the Joining Process of a network device. It will basically allocate su-
perframes and links to the device regarding joining, advertisement, request/response
traffic, keep alive s and health reports. nickname represents the short address of the
joining device. This function will fetch information about routing from NDDBstore
the Scheduling tables (Superframe and Link table) correspondent to Network Devices
affected in the communication in the NDDB (refer to 5.5.2.4).It returns true when the
schedule is created correctly.
unScheduleDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16) :boolean Function used by the NetworkManagerProces-
sUnit when disconnecting a network device from the WHART Network. nickname
represents the short address of the disconnecting device. It returns true when correctly
deallocated from the schedule.
scheduleServiceToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, serviceID:Unsigned-8, serviceDomain:Enum-8, period:Time)
: boolean Function used by the NetworkManagerProcessUnit when allocating ser-
vices to a Network Device. It returns true when correctly allocated.
unScheduleService
(nickname:Unsigned-16, serviceID:Unsigned-8) :boolean Function used by the Net-
workManagerProcessUnit when deallocating services to a Network Device. It returns
true when correctly deallocated.
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5.5.2.4 Description for Network Device Database
Figure 5.16 represents the internal design of the Network Device Database.
Network Device Database Interface to NMPU. iDB
addGateway
(GWuniqueID:Unsigned-16,GWLongTag:Latin-1) :Unsigned-16 It registers the
Gateway in the database.
addAccessPoint
(APUniqueID:Unsigned-40,GWUniqueID:Unsigned-40) :Unsigned-16 It returns
the nickname of the Access Point.
addNetworkDevice
(uniqueID:Unsigned-16,LongTag:Latin-1) :Unsigned-16 It adds the Network De-
vice to the WHART Network Device Database. If the process has been successful it
will return the nickname of the Network Device added to the Network.
addNeighborRSLReport
(nickname:Unsigned-16,neighborID[]:Unsigned-16,RSL[]) :Unsigned-16 It stores
the information regarding the neighbors of the device.
addSessionToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16,PeerNickname:Unsigned-16,keyType:Enum-8,SessionKey:Unsigned-
128) :Unsigned-16 It adds session to the device and it is stored in the database.
addDeviceHealthReport
(nickname:Unsigned-16,healthData[]:byte) :Unsigned-16 It adds the Health in-
formation of device to the database.
addNeighborHealthReport
(nickname:Unsigned-16,neighborHealthData[]:byte) :Unsigned-16 It adds the Neigh-
bor’s Health information of the device to the database.
getTimeSourceNeighborID
(nickname:Unsigned-16):Unsigned-16 It returns the neighbor ID of the time source
for the specific network device
getNotUpdatedEntries
(type:Enum-8,nickname[]:Unsigned-16,data[][]:byte) :TableEntry[] It returns the
Table Entries that has not been updated in the WirelessHART Network.
Network Device Database Interface to Routing Unit. iRouteDB
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addRouteTableToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, routeID:Unsigned-8, graphID-:Unsigned-16, sourceRoute[]:Unsigned-
16) :boolean Adds a Route table to a Network Device in the database. This info will
be fetch by the NetworkManagerProcessUnit from the Network Device Database for
configuring the correspondent network device through HART commands. It returns
true when correctly added.
addGraphTableToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, graphID:Unsigned-16, neighborsID[]:Unsigned-16) :boolean
Adds a Graph table to a Network Device in the database. This info will be fetch by the
NetworkManagerProcessUnit from the Network Device Database for configuring the
correspondent network device through HART commands.
getNeighborRSLFromDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, neighborID[]:Unsigned-16, RSL[]:Signed-8) :Void Gets
Neighbor Received Signal Levels from a determined Network Device. This informa-
tion will be used in deciding the graph paths.
Network Device Database Interface to Scheduling Unit. iScheduleDB
addSuperframeToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, superframeID:Unsigned-8, numSlots:Unsigned-16, ModeFlag:Enum-
8) :boolean Adds a Superframe to a device in the database. If the device does not
exist it returns -1.
addLinkToDevice
(nickname:Unsigned-16, superframeID:Unsigned-8, slot, channelOffset, linkType,
linkOption) :boolean Adds a link to a device in the database. If the device or the
superframe does not exist it returns -1.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future work
6.1 Conclusions
The introduction of the wireless technology in the industrial realm revealed an imperi-
ous need of a standardized wireless communication protocol, capable of guaranteeing
the fulfillment of the strict industrial requirements. In this sense, the HART Communi-
cation Foundation(HCF) created the first open standard addressed to the stated matter:
WirelessHART.
Due to the novelty of the WirelessHART, plenty of research is in progress in order
to analyse the real capabilities of WirelessHART. In this manner, we have performed an
exhaustive scrutiny of the most decisive component of WirelessHART: The Network
Manager.
The Network Manager plays a key role as the central point of management within
the WirelessHART network. It is responsible for configuring the network, schedul-
ing communications, managing route tables and monitoring the health of the network.
However, a lack of a standardized software design and architecture of the Network
Manager, together with the absence of a clear and detailed description of the Network
Manager can discourage the establishment of the WirelessHART standard.
On that account, we have addressed these key concerns with the present thesis.
We have performed (1) an exhaustive analysis of the WirelessHART specification, and
later, we have focused in every matter regarding the operation and functionalities of the
Network Manager, isolating and presenting (2) a compact specification of the software
requirements of the Network Manager. In addition, we have proposed (3) solutions to
some question marks unclear in the standard. Finally, we have provided a (4) software
design and architecture of the Network Manager, describing its internal subcomponents
and functionalities.
In conclusion, the process of implantation of wireless technology in industry com-
munications, together with the need for secure, reliable and interoperable standards,
challenges the academic and industrial research to achieve a collective and optimal so-
lution, which implies reducing costs and saving energy. With the present work, we have
provided a module for WirelessHART which contributes in establishing WirelessHART
as the wireless solution in the industrial process domain.
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6.2 Future work
This thesis can be regarded as a big step towards the implementation of the Wire-
lessHART Network Manager. We have provided a modular and extensible design that
can be used in future research. Future work can be focused on particular functionalities
of the WirelessHART Network Manager.
The most critical responsibilities of the WirelessHART Network Manager are rout-
ing and scheduling, which determine the performance of the overall WHART network
in terms of throughput and reliability. Future efforts will be focused on determining
the most appropriate routing and scheduling algorithms for specific applications in Au-
tomation Industry. Scheduling in WirelessHART is, to the best of our knowledge, the
most challenging and still unsolved area of research.
Building prototypes of the Network Manager will also aid to adapt the complex
task of management to the concrete necessities of the distinct industrial applications.
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Appendix A
HART Commands
A.1 Command 977. Gateway Join Request
This HART command is used by Gateways for Requesting the Network Manager ini-
tialization of the WHART network. It
Request Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0-4 Unsigned-40 UniqueID of the Gateway
4-35 Latin-1 Long Tag of the Gateway
36 Unsigned-8 Number of Access Points
37-41 Unsigned-40 UniqueID of Access Point 1
... UniqueID of AccessPoint n
Response Data Bytes
Byte Format Description
0-4 Unsigned-40 UniqueID of the Gateway
4-35 Latin-1 Long Tag of the Gateway
36 Unsigned-8 Number of Access Points
37-41 Unsigned-40 UniqueID of Access Point 1
... UniqueID of AccessPoint n
Command-Specific Response Codes
Byte Format Description
0 Success No Command-specific Errors
1-4 Undefined
5 Error Too Few Data Bytes Received
37-41 Unsigned-40 UniqueID of Access Point 1
... UniqueID of AccessPoint n
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Appendix B
Data types
This appendix will clarify wich data types we use in the design of the WirelessHART
Network Manager. They refer to data types included in the standard. It’s is up to the
implementor to decide wether to use a dedcated class for each data type. For interested
readers, more information about data types on WHART specification can be found in
[14] sect. 5.
• Bits Byte in which each bit has a specific meaning. bit 0 is the least significant
• Date The date consists in 8-bit binary unsigned integers that represents the day,
month and year minus 1900, respectively. Day is first.
• Enum-n An integer enumeration in which each number has a specific meaning.
n represents the Only the values specified in [20] will be valid.
• Latin-1 It is a 32 bytes string composed by 8-bit ISO Latin-1 characters. Lating-
1 is padded with zeroes (0x00)
• Signed-n a signed integer of size n bits.
• Time An unsigned 32-bit binary integer representing the time in 1/32 of a mil-
lisecond, i.e. the least significant bit is 0.03125 ms.
• Unsigned-n An usingned integer of size nbits.
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